“Kulturkampf[s]” or “fit[s] of spite”?:
Taking the Academic Culture Wars Seriously
1
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INTRODUCTION
Polarization and heated debate within legal academia are
nothing new. Some might argue that vigorous contentiousness, even
if not always civil, is essential to a healthy intellectual culture. Others
would note that lawyers, legal academics especially, are a highly
2
contentious bunch with a reputation for aggressive behavior.
Heated debates between traditionalists and new emerging
jurisprudential movements have been part of modern legal academia.
Other notable jurisprudential battles include the exchanges between
the defenders of classical legal theory and the legal realists in the
1930s through late 1950s. These were followed by the battles
between the legal realists and legal process theorists in the 1940s and
late 1950s. The legal process school, in turn, spurred a countercritique by the law and society movement of the 1960s; then followed
critical legal studies (CLS), feminist jurisprudence, Critical Race
Theory (CRT), and last but not least, law and economics in the 1970s.
Fifteen years ago, from his podium as Dean of Duke Law School, Paul
Carrington suggested that “nihilist teachers,” a reference to CLS
3
practitioners, had “an ethical duty to depart the law school . . . .” In
the debate that followed, Dean Carrington was accused of censorship
*

Justice Myron Leavitt Professor of Law, University of Nevada–Las Vegas,
William S. Boyd School of Law. Thanks to Jean R. Sternlight for her insightful
comments.
1
I am paraphrasing from Justice Scalia’s opening line in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), where he commented in dissent: “The Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf [culture war] for a fit of spite.” Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 34 (1996) (“It is
difficult to imagine many historians of either generation writing the kind of meanspirited polemics law professors periodically produce.”).
3
See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
He defines nihilists as people who believe that “law is a mere deception by which the
powerful weaken the resistance of the powerless.” Id. (citing Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983)).
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and intolerance. Dean Carrington’s defenders eventually pled for
5
the academic freedom to express such views. Meanwhile, CLS as a
jurisprudential movement has principally gone international, and in
the United States only a handful of scholars continue to explore CLS.
Fundamentally, this Article asks whether strife and disagreement
are a necessary part of academic discourse. Part I describes the
academic Kulturkampfs aimed at CRT that have taken place in the
6
last ten years both outside of and within the CRT movement. Part I
particularly examines what it is that academics are actually fighting
about, whether the debate is actually overly personal, and whether
these “fits of spite” are a part of the necessary conflict of major
intellectual movements that are required to advance the collective
knowledge. Describing the past and ongoing academic Kulturkampfs
is a necessary first step to understanding whether the divide can be
bridged and whether the conflict that we experience might lead to
the better production of knowledge.
Part II further analyzes what is causing the division in the
ongoing academic Kulturkampfs.
Scholarship shrouds the
differences in seemingly neutral terms, but much of the struggle is
fueled by personal concerns. With respect to outsider critiques of
CRT, the sources of strife can be reduced to three central questions.
First, do whites, in particular men and heterosexuals, oppress
minorities and women?
Second, are racism, sexism, and
homophobia so endemic that they have become permanent fixtures
in American society? Finally, how do you make objective judgments
of others in a world where neutrality and objectivity are suspect?
Kulturkampfs also play out with insider critiques. Recently, we have
seen struggles about who defines the discipline of CRT, and seen
reactions to the assimilationist–separationist dilemma. Some of the
questions cannot be answered, or the differences bridged, but we can
ameliorate anxieties by being more exact and careful in how we
differ. While resolution may not be possible, it is important to
identify the fundamental gaps as well as areas of common ground.
With the democratization of legal academia to include law
4

For an overview of this exchange, see generally David A. Kaplan, A Scholarly
War of Words over Academic Freedom, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 1; and “Of Law and the
River,” and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) (various
authors), which documents revealing exchanges between Dean Carrington and CLS
and other liberal scholars (hereinafter “Of Law and the River”).
5
“Of Law and the River”, supra note 4 passim. Dean Carrington currently devotes
the bulk of his scholarship to alternative dispute resolution, not to jurisprudence.
6
For the sake of convenient nomenclature, I will refer to CRT, LatCrit, and
APIA critical studies collectively as CRT.
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professors of different genders, races, and sexual orientations has
come a loss of community, cohesion, and coherence. But what has
been gained has been a more democratic and inclusive community.
To believe that academics can again speak with a unified voice is no
longer possible. Instead of despairing, legal academics must come to
accept a new order in which disagreement is a constant. In this new
order, the way in which legal academics choose to disagree will be just
as important as the merit of their ideas.
I. THE MANY FLAVORS OF ACADEMIC KULTURKAMPF
Legal academia’s version of the culture wars is getting so shrill
that it has become difficult to tell whether one is experiencing an
aggressive exchange, colored with some occasional “fit[s] of spite,” or
whether legal academia is about to become prey to a divisive
“Kulturkampf.” In the last decade and a half there have been at least
four eruptions of academic Kulturkampfs. Each in its own way has
left its mark on the further development of scholarship and the
individual jurisprudential movements. This Part examines these four
eruptions.
A. Vanilla Versus Chocolate: Neo-Traditionalists Versus the Race Crits
Professors Farber and Sherry’s publication in 1997 of Beyond All
7
Reason touched off a high profile round between the race crits and
the neo-traditionalists. In their book, the authors restate for popular
consumption the critiques they had previously published in law
review articles. Even though Beyond All Reason contains nothing new,
this repackaged missive had greater impact, as measured by the
frequency with which it has been engaged, having been reviewed by
8
close to a dozen reputable scholars. In addition, it prompted highprofile bashing by prominent judges, reputable news media, and
9
legal commentators. Some reasons as to why Farber and Sherry
7

DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
8
For earlier just as withering critiques of CRT, see generally ARTHUR AUSTIN,
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION
(1998); Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157,
1159–60 (attacking CRT on the ground that it is not “real” scholarship and does not
deal with appropriate legal concerns); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional
Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992) (distinguishing between forms of CRT narratives
that are more or less helpful to understanding difficult constitutional dilemmas).
9
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091
(1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Book of
Manners: How to Conduct a Conversation on Race—Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and
Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051 (1998) (same) [hereinafter Delgado, Book of Manners];
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enjoyed a higher profile than other equally blistering critiques might
be that these are liberal scholars, and their criticism was more
notable because it comes from quarters where support might have
10
been expected.
As well, they are two highly regarded and wellpublished constitutional law scholars teaching at top law schools.
The attacks unleashed on CRT as a result of the publication of
Beyond All Reason were scathing. Judge Posner, in his book review
essay published in The New Republic, took the occasion to call all
critical scholars the “lunatic fringe” and critical race scholars
11
“whiners” and the “lunatic core.” In his New York Times book review,
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit accused “multiculturalists
12
[of] rais[ing] insuperable barriers to mutual understanding.” The
Wall Street Journal published an essay asserting that feminist
jurisprudence and CRT were “antithetical to the very notion of law”
and warning lawyers to be wary of the “mediocre legal scholars” now
inhabiting law schools who teach that “American society is
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Race and Reason: The Assault on Critical Race Theory and the
Truth About Inequality, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1998); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Truth or
Consequences? The Inadequacy of Consequentialist Arguments Against Multicultural
Relativism, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 185 (1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note
7); Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J.
795 (1998); Deborah C. Malamud, The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative
Action Debate, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 915 (1998) (responding to Farber and Sherry’s thesis
that CRT is anti-Semitic); Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches to
Identity, Merit, and Responsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109
(1997) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7); Francis G. Mootz, III, Between
Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 605 (1998) (same); Daria Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst: The Assault on
Radicals in American Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1658 (1998) (same); Edward Rubin, Jews,
Truth, and Critical Race Theory, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 525 (1998) (same); Richard A.
Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (same).
10
Accord Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry,
46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 668 (1993) (characterizing Farber and Sherry otherwise as
“serious and careful commentators” and “well-intentioned” and therefore regarding
the task of correcting their “thematic” errors as a necessary one).
11
See Posner, The Skin Trade, supra note 9, at 40; see also id. at 43 (“[C]ritical race
theorists come across as whiners and wolf-criers.”); id. at 42 (“[C]ritical race theorists
teach by example that the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a
comfortable professional salary to write childish stories about how awful it is to be a
member of such a group.”). Tellingly, Professor Posner’s most in-depth analysis of
critical race theory is his twenty-two page discussion of Patricia Williams’ narratives in
Alchemy of Race and Rights in his almost 600-page opus, Overcoming Law. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 368–84 (1996) (discussing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
12
See Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law: Are Radical Multiculturalists Poisoning Young
Legal Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 46 (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note
7). Kozinski also accuses critical race theorists of conspiring in the “judicial
appointments” “game” of “picking judges who will enshrine the right policy into the
Constitution.” Id.
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pathologically racist and sexist . . . .” In The New Republic, Jeffrey
Rosen argued that Johnnie Cochran was an example of an “applied
critical race theorist” when he “shameful[ly]” played the “race card”
14
in the O.J. Simpson trial.
These critiques are characterized by their highly combustible
quality. Informed accounts in the popular press of the debate
between the new crits and the neo-traditionalists were rare to
nonexistent. I could only locate one article in the major newspapers
15
that attempted to present both sides of the debate. Most of the
popular press articles carried inflammatory titles, such as Law’s Racial
16
Academics Get Thrashing They Deserve, An Academic Theory Threatens the
17
Foundations of the Law, and Danger: Critical Race Theory Approaching
18
from the South.
Not surprisingly, these high-profile barbs sparked a series of
counter-volleys. In a 1999 Minnesota Law Review symposium, “Essays
in Response to Beyond All Reason,” critical race scholars Jerome Culp
and John Calmore charged that Farber and Sherry lacked good faith
19
and had mischaracterized CRT. But each went further. Professor
13

Heather MacDonald, Rule of Law: Law School Humbug, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
1995, at A21.
14
Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27.
15
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Black Scholars View Society with Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1997, at A11 (interviewing or quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Dan Farber, and Suzanna
Sherry as well as Tanya Lovell Banks, Anthony Cook, and Patricia Williams).
16
Michael Skube, Law’s Radical Academics Get Thrashing They Deserve, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 16, 1997, at 12L (commenting that CRT “retail[s] absurdities”).
17
William Domarski, An Academic Theory Threatens the Foundations of the Law, 143
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 21, 1997, at 3 (praising Farber and Sherry for “taking us
away” from the “Alice in Wonderland” world of the radical multiculturalists).
18
Heather Mallick, Danger: Critical Race Theory Approaching from the South,
TORONTO SUN, Feb. 16, 1997, at C10 (describing CRT as “overblown and foolish” and
the “product of cheap shots and blind prejudice”); see also Shawn Mitchell, Critical
Race Theory: A Legal Argument to Radically Alter Rights in U.S., ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
July 25, 1993, at 9A (arguing that CRT solutions are “impractical, unconstitutional . .
. and make race relations much, much worse”); George F. Will, Editorial, Playing the
Race Card, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1996, at B8 (accusing critical race theorists
of “playing the race card”); Legal Mumbo Jumbo Law Professors’ Jokes, ARIZ.
REPUPLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1995, at B4 (reporting that law professors “play
jokes on students called CRT and feminist jurisprudence”).
19
John O. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior—Part 2: A Critical
Response to the Hegemonic “Truth” of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1589, 1617 (1999) (“[The] most troubling [thing] about the Farber-Sherry view is
that I do not see good faith there. . . . [T]here is just too much bad, ‘unavoidable
conclusion’ stuff . . . .”); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White
Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1654–55 (1999) (asking, almost rhetorically, how the
author’s work regarding minority assimilation could have been misread, and
connecting Farber and Sherry’s mischaracterization of his work to attacks in the
national media characterizing CRT as having an “ugly streak”).
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Calmore accused Farber and Sherry of “dehumaniz[ing]” CRT
20
scholars by playing into negative racial stereotypes, of “hav[ing]
written quite the officious and condescending book . . . [which]
21
should really be buried,” and of “act[ing] as secret agents of a very
right-wing racial project” describing the attacks as “not friendly fire at
all, but, rather, enemy fire . . . a command for the critical race
22
theorists to ‘shut up’ and ‘stay in your place.’” Finally, Professor
Calmore posited that Farber and Sherry’s “racism represents a bias for
23
people of color, but only as long as people of color stay in our place.”
Professor Culp charged that Farber and Sherry wrote a book that
“appeases the conservative thirst to smite infidels” and “has only the
barest pretensions of the objectivity or the thoroughness that they
24
require of others.” He connected Farber and Sherry’s uncharitable
mischaracterization of his work to attacks on CRT by the national
25
media.
CRT theorists were not the only ones that charged that Farber
and Sherry’s critique was excessive and unhelpful. Feminist scholar
Kathryn Abrams detailed at length her countercharge that Farber
and Sherry uncharitably abbreviated feminist and critical race
scholars’ works, painting feminists and critical race theorists to be
26
extreme and nonsensical.
Professor Edward Rubin as well was
critical of Farber and Sherry’s overbroad arguments, seeing crits
more as the current heirs of postmodern continental philosophy,
27
than as a “threat” to traditional academic values. Professor Deborah
Malamud countered Farber and Sherry’s charge that critical race
scholarship is anti-Semitic, arguing that this argument is both
overbroad and overly simplistic, and fails to take into account the
unique socioeconomic situation of Eastern European Jewish

20

Calmore, supra note 19, at 1598. Professor Calmore further explains that, “[i]n
many ways, Farber and Sherry have taken the humanity out of critical race theory
and linked it to the racial grotesque.” Id.
21
Id. at 1591.
22
Id. at 1605.
23
Id. at 1606.
24
Culp, supra note 19, at 1638, 1655.
25
Id. at 1654–55. For other critical race theorists’ critiques, see generally
Delgado, Book of Manners, supra note 9, at 1059 (drawing parallels between Farber
and Sherry’s work and white imperial scholarship and arguing that this kind of thrust
drowns out the works of young critical scholars who might have something new and
innovative to say); Roithmayr, supra note 9, at 1658 (suggesting that Farber and
Sherry seem to imagine that a handful of “angry radical scholars, dark-skinned
fanatics in their Che Berets” might take over legal academia).
26
Abrams, supra note 9, at 1091.
27
See Rubin, supra note 9, at 532.

2005

ACADEMIC CULTURE WARS

1315

28

emigrants at the turn of the century.
Farber and Sherry responded by cataloging the “insults [that]
flow freely in the law reviews” and accusing these critical theorists of
29
using charges of racism to avoid valid criticisms. The titles of two
other essays in the Minnesota Law Review symposium further illustrate
the “gloves off,” “no-prisoners” approach that characterized this
important debate. For example, Matthew Finkin’s contribution was
30
entitled “QUATSCH!,” colloquial German for “nonsense.” Professor
Subotnik used the not too subtle acronym “CRAT,” which comes
31
close to “crap,” to describe CRT. Steven Gey was only a tad more
32
polite, entitling his essay Why Rubbish Matters.
Amazingly, Farber and Sherry maintain that they wish to
33
“encourage dialogue.” The problem, as they see it, is with “the most
34
radical forms of deconstruction.” Yet, it is difficult to see how this
strident rhetoric, only briefly captured here, can ever possibly lead to
35
intellectual engagement. Not only is this debate more shrill than
illuminative, it also comes through as a very personal fight for
36
everyone involved.
37
The Farber and Sherry attacks are now over a decade old. They
did encourage virulent and unfair attacks in the media on CRT and
its practitioners. Notwithstanding, CRT is still firmly lodged within
28

See Malamud, supra note 9, at 921–40; see also Hills, supra note 9, at 185
(criticizing Farber and Sherry’s overuse of consequentialist arguments).
29
See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Criticism?, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1735, 1738–40 nn.6–24 (1999).
30
Matthew W. Finkin, QUATSCH!, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1681 (1999). Finkin believes
that CRT is comparable to fascism. Id. at 1700.
31
See Daniel Subotnik, What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory?: Reopening the Case
for Middle Class Values, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 682 n.4 (1998) (“I use this
acronym to distinguish race theorists from CRITs.”).
32
Steven G. Gey, Why Rubbish Matters: The Neoconservative Underpinnings of Social
Constructionist Theory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707 (1999).
33
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 141.
34
Id. at 140. This may be an attempt perhaps on their part to not include in
their attacks certain genres of CRT that they do respect, particularly feminist
scholarship, in which Professor Sherry sees herself participating.
35
Accord AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 199 (“A plea for a friendly dialogue is seemingly
incongruous in the face of the heated exchanges . . . .”); Anne M. Coughlin, C’est
Moi, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (1999) (finding it “harder than ever to imagine the
two schools meeting”).
36
See, e.g., infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text; Abrams, supra note 9, at
1112 n.38 (interjecting that she takes her Jewish identity seriously and finding
unseemly charges that the “multiculturalists” are anti-Semitic); see also supra note 19
(providing responses of Professors Calmore and Culp to Farber and Sherry).
37
In their book, Beyond all Reason, supra note 7, the authors reconfigure their
criticism initially published in Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STANFORD L. REV. 807 (1993).
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38

legal academia, and is arguably doing well. There is at least one
CRT scholar at most of the elite law schools, CRT workshops and
conferences continue in one form or another, and the second
generation CRT movements such as LatCrit and APIA (Asian/Pacific
Islander American) critical scholarship are doing well within legal
academia. CRT’s influence has expanded beyond legal scholarship,
as there are now anthologies in education, sociology, and religious
39
ethics.
B. Java, Mocha, or Coffee?: Randall Kennedy and the Dispute over a
“Voice of Color”
Predating this row came a very high-profile challenge to CRT by
40
Professor Randall Kennedy in his Racial Critiques of Legal Academia.
This Kulturkampf never approached the combustible quality of the
Beyond All Reason exchanges, and unlike the Beyond All Reason
exchange, it has had a far greater positive impact on the development
of critical race scholarship. Professor Kennedy, in an article
published just before he made tenure at Harvard Law School,
critiqued critical race theorists Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and
41
Mari Matsuda, arguing that critical race scholars exhibit “a tendency
to evade or suppress complications that render their conclusions
problematic . . . [because] [t]hey fail to support persuasively their
claims of racial exclusion or their claims that legal academic scholars
38

For some the jury is still out; see, for example, POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra
note 11, at 105 (“[A] dislocation of the settled ways of thinking could improve the
field. Law and economics has had this effect, and feminist legal scholarship as well.
Maybe minority scholarship will too.”). But Professor Jeffrey Stempel notes that
“substantial . . . acceptance” is all that is necessary for outsider jurisprudence to take
a hold in legal academia. Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or
Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 659, 697 n.137 (1993). Stempel cites as evidence that feminism, CLS, and law
and economics, in spite of initial strident objections, obtained substantial acceptance
in academe within a few years. Id.
39
See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION (1999)
(providing a study by a historian applying theoretical work by Williams and others to
studying how race was “reconstructed” during the post-Civil War era); RACE IS—RACE
ISN’T: CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUCATION (Laurence
Parker et al. eds., 1996) (performing series of studies that apply work by Williams,
Delgado, and Bell to race conflicts in primary education); SHARON D. WELCH, SWEET
DREAMS IN AMERICA: MAKING ETHICS AND SPIRITUALITY WORK (1999) (applying
Williams’ and other CRT theoretical approaches to rethinking a religious ethic of
progressive social change and current issues of multiculturalism).
40
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989) [hereinafter Kennedy, Racial Critiques].
41
Id. at 1781–84. Kennedy’s critique is often cited with Stephen Carter’s,
another Harvard Law School professor. See Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black, and
Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 6.
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of color produce a racially distinctive brand of valuable scholarship.”
Professor Kennedy contended that these critical minority scholars
placed too much emphasis on an experienced commonality of
“oppression,” and in particular, that Professors Delgado and Bell
43
overstated the relative influence of racial prejudice. In a passage
that was close to getting personal, Professor Kennedy confronted
Professor Derrick Bell’s ongoing one-man crusade against Harvard
Law School, which had failed to hire any African American women
44
faculty for almost three decades. Kennedy asserted that Bell failed
to engage competing hypotheses to explain the small number of
45
professors of color in elite law schools. In critiquing Professor Mari
Matsuda’s work, Professor Kennedy asserted that she overstated the
values of a “special” or “distinct” minority legal scholarship and by
making that argument stigmatized other minority scholars by
46
claiming that they speak as “victims of racial oppression.”
The Kennedy critique occasioned great consternation among
critical race and liberal scholars. Randall Kennedy’s high visibility
position within legal academia, as one of two African American male
professors who had succeeded Derrick Bell at Harvard Law School,
played a critical role in the notice that his attack received.
Interestingly, Randall Kennedy styles himself a “race relations”
47
scholar, and has written extensively, albeit primarily from an
individualistic perspective, about the (mis)treatment and
48
(mis)characterizations of African Americans in the law.
42

Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1749.
Id. at 1770, 1776.
44
DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:
REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTOR (1994). The relationship, as depicted in published writings, between
Professors Kennedy and Bell can be currently characterized as highly personal and
acrimonious. Compare Derrick Bell, The Strange Career of Randall Kennedy, NEW
POLITICS, Summer 1998, at 55 (describing Kennedy as “quite willing to take his
differences with black people public in ways that—whether intended or not—serve to
comfort many whites and distress blacks” and that “render him an apologist [for]
aspects of [a] . . . system that are less overtly racist than in earlier times but no less
ominous in the threat they pose for all blacks”), with Randall Kennedy, Race Relations
Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2001–04 (2000)
(responding to Bell’s critique and arguing that Bell is overly certain of what is the
“correct” civil rights position on controversial race relations issues) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Race Relations Law].
45
Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1764.
46
Id. at 1778.
47
See Kennedy, Race Relations Law, supra note 44, at 1985–2010 (arguing that race
relations law should be taught as a standard part of a law school’s curriculum).
48
See, e.g., RANDALL L. KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); RANDALL L. KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER
OF A TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); RANDALL L. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
43
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The response by critical race scholars was published in a
49
Perhaps the most
symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review.
perceptive counter-critique was Dean Alex M. Johnson’s The New Voice
50
of Color. In his analysis, Dean Johnson argued that Bell, Matsuda,
and Delgado speak from a communalistic perspective and from
egalitarian ideology, while on the other hand, Kennedy’s
interpretation of racial experience is individualistic and
51
meritocratic. Further, Kennedy does not make claims for the entire
community of racial minorities; rather, he insists that the individual
voice of African American conservatives and neo-conservatives be
given as much weight as the voices of egalitarian progressives such as
52
Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda.
By contrast, Johnson characterized
Matsuda, Bell, and Delgado as wishing to improve the circumstances
of those in minority communities who are most disadvantaged and as
believing that responsibility for alleviating this wrong lies in the white
male community which historically has been advantaged by such
53
social hierarchies.
At the time, the Kennedy versus Bell–Delgado–Matsuda
controversy was believed to be divisive among minority legal scholars,
and some criticized Kennedy privately for making his critique so
pointed and public. Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, a symposium response appearing in the Minnesota Law
Review, Professor Alex Johnson’s friendly comment, and other well54
written and influential commentary by Professors Duncan Kennedy
55
and Richard Delgado helped to highlight that at the heart of this
(1997). For an extensive discussion of Kennedy’s views on interracial adoption, see
Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421
(2004).
49
Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1844, 1844–86 (1990) (presenting commentary by Scott Brewer, Milner
S. Ball, Robin D. Barnes, Richard Delgado, and Leslie G. Espinoza); Leslie G.
Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878,
1884–86 (1990) (arguing that minority works express the profound effect of racism
and recognize the manifestations of racial exclusion).
50
See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2008–11
(1991).
51
Id. at 2036, 2040–42.
52
Id. at 2047.
53
Id. at 2040, 2045–47.
54
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (criticizing Randall Kennedy from a CLS perspective).
55
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left–Right Parallels in Recent
Writings About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547 (1991) (identifying the gap between
“neo-conservatives” and “crits” as resulting from different emphases on individual
agency and volition, use of history, and whether the key to racial oppression is
individual acts of discrimination or systemic societal forces); Richard Delgado,
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controversy was a genuine and deep difference of opinion as to what
a minority perspective might be, its potential value to legal
scholarship, how prevalent and endemic racism was rooted in
American society and elite institutions, and what methodologies
should be used in analyzing racial issues. These are fundamental
differences that go to the heart of the CRT enterprise, and continue
to divide scholars, both within CRT and without. The issues of antiessentialism and the problematic use of terms like “subordination,”
which simultaneously disempowers even as it identifies a systemic
inequality, broached by Professor Kennedy, remain important and his
critique helped CRT recognize, at a very initial point, that there
would be ongoing disagreements as to the value of CRT or “Black
56
scholarship.”
Professor Kennedy remains outside of the CRT
movement, but remains committed to continue to explore “the
depth, complexity, and pervasiveness of racial controversies in the
57
United States.” He has recently called for law schools to do a better
job educating young lawyers in the complexities of race relations; to
fail to do so, he intimates is the equivalent of educational
58
malpractice.
This is a position that CRT scholars would
enthusiastically endorse.
C. Lemons or Lemonade?: APIA Crits and the Call for a New Legal
Movement
A very similar split occurred in an exchange that featured Jim
Chen, Farber and Sherry’s then-colleague at the University of
Minnesota Law School, and eight critical race and liberal scholars.
59
Professor Chen launched the first strike in Unloving, a short essay
Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (addressing Randall Kennedy's essentialism critique).
56
For example, Delgado’s collection on critical race theory includes Randall
Kennedy’s critique as well as Leslie Espinoza’s rebuttal. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE 431–57 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter DELGADO, CRT:
THE CUTTING EDGE]. In a section entitled, “Criticism and Self-analysis,” Delgado
acknowledges Kennedy’s contribution to CRT: “[S]ometimes a movement’s themes
and distinctive contours will emerge most clearly in the crucible of criticism.” Id. at
431. As well, Professors Jerome Culp and Alex Johnson underscore points of
agreement between their CRT perspective and Kennedy’s, yet both maintain that
Kennedy’s “race relations” approach is unpersuasive. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39,
103; Johnson, supra note 50, at 2040.
57
Kennedy, Race Relations Law, supra note 44, at 1986.
58
See id.
59
Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145 (1994). For the only commentary on
this debate, see Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV.
535 (2001).
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that criticized Professor Robert Chang’s declaration of an “Asian
American Moment” propitious for launching a new critical Asian
60
American legal scholarship. Professor Chang was hearkening back
to the 1980s when a group of critical scholars had declared a key
61
“moment” for critical race theory. Chen’s objection to Chang’s rally
call centered around what he characterized as “racial
62
fundamentalism,” a mode of racial thinking that he boiled down to
63
Chen argued that
the tenet, “dark skin good, white skin bad.”
64
Chang’s “racial fundamentalism” opposed assimilation, ignoring the
reality of what Chen viewed as inevitable “creolization”—by which
65
Chen meant interbreeding—of America, and fostered segregation
66
and isolation of racial and ethnic minorities.
Moreover, Chen
67
argued that Chang condemned the “creolization” of America. As
support, Chen pointed to a Chang footnote in which he bemoans
that his “future children and their future children will always be Asian
68
Americans.”
From this remark, Chen concluded that Chang
“certainly seems as though he positively wants his descendants to have
69
naught but Asian blood.”
60

See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1314 (1993) (“The
time has come to announce once again an Asian American Moment. With it comes
an Asian American Legal Scholarship . . . .”); see also ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED:
ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 48 (1999) (“A critical Asian American
legal studies is needed to change the current racial paradigm, which is inadequate to
support a more complete discourse on race and the law.”).
61
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
xvi–xix (Kimberlè Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Culp, supra note 56, at 40
(announcing “an African-American Moment, when different and blacker voices will
speak new words and remake old legal doctrines”).
62
Chen describes racial fundamentalism as proposing,
(1) that white racism has always thwarted and will always thwart equality
for nonwhites in America, (2) that nonwhites will always be at a
disadvantage within white-dominated society, and (3) that nonwhites
should therefore celebrate their own isolation rather than take part in
the self-abnegation that is assimilation.
Chen, supra note 59, at 158–59.
63
Id. at 156.
64
Id. at 158 (“Chang has plainly rejected the goal of integration through
multiracial assimilation and adaptation.”). But see infra note 74 (rebutting this
reading of Chang’s work).
65
Chen, supra note 59, at 150, 152 (“I regard the United States of America as the
Creole Republic. . . . Crossbreeding in the Creole fashion . . . extends to the
bedroom. Sexuality, like water and money, seeks its own level.”) (footnotes omitted).
66
Id. at 161–62.
67
Id. at 155 (“What I call ‘racial fundamentalism’ rejects . . . the rise of the
Creole Republic.”).
68
Id. at 158 (citing Chang, supra note 60, at 1318–19 n.403).
69
Id. at 159.
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Eight scholars responded to Chen in the Iowa Law Review’s
70
As in the prior symposium
subsequent symposium on Unloving.
counter-critiquing Professor Randall Kennedy, many articulated
broader themes highlighting once again that at the core of this
debate are fundamental differences in perspectives on race relations
71
in America.
Several argued that Chen’s optimistic claims of the
inevitable American “creolization” are neither persuasive, nor backed
by either history or the current politics of majority–minority
72
relations. Chen’s view that Americans of all ethnicities and race
would eventually assimilate was viewed by some as unsupported
73
musings. Others rebutted Chen’s ungenerous reading of Chang’s
74
footnote.
Professor Chen’s highly charged personal attack of Professor
Chang, however, prompted responses with a personal edge. Several
75
scholars condemned Unloving as “backlash scholarship,” “vicious
70

Colloquy, 81 IOWA L REV. 1467 (1996) (commentary by Keith Aoki, Margaret
Chon, Garret Epps, Frederick Dennis Greene, Neil Gotanda, Natsu Saito Jenga, Peter
Kwan, and Alfred Yen).
71
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Chon on Chen and Chang, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1536
(1996) (describing how the disagreement can be traced to modernist and
postmodernist modes of knowing); Neil Gotanda, Chen the Chosen: Reflections on
Unloving, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1589–90 (1996) (arguing that Chen fails to
recognize that the category “Asian American” is contested and complex, unlike
Chang); Natsu Saito Jenga, Unconscious: The “Just Say No” Response to Racism, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1503, 1504–06 (1996) (noting that Chang and Chen differ as to whether
color blindness is a solution to racism); Peter Kwan, Unconvincing, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1557, 1559–60 (1996) (finding that interracial mixing is an aspiration from critical
race theory perspective and not a current social reality, which is Chen’s starting
point); Alfred C. Yen, Unhelpful, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1573, 1578–79 (1996) (noting that
Chang and Chen differ as to whether oppression occasions a shared group
perspective).
72
See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 71, at 1588–89 (arguing that Chen wrongly uses
older racial science, ignoring a century of evolving scientific contentions of
biological descent).
73
See, e.g., Chon, supra note 71, at 1540–54 (contending that Chang fails to make
the case for inevitable minority assimilation); Jenga, supra note 71, at 1518 (“Creating
interracial families cannot, on its own, eliminate racism. . . . [Rather it] almost
guarantees that one will not be able to proceed in a ‘colorblind’ manner . . .
[because] [i]nterracial couples face heightened scrutiny by both the general public
and their family, friends and acquaintances.”).
74
See, e.g., Garret Epps, What’s Loving Got to Do with It?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1489,
1491–92 (1996) (arguing that Chang’s footnote is a “slender reed” and Chen only
offers anecdotes from his own personal experience to rebut Chang’s careful
analysis); Jenga, supra note 71, at 1511 (contending that Chang did not say his
children could not have other heritages, rather it is Chen who “forces” racial
categories onto mixed-race offspring); Yen, supra note 71, at 1576 (rebutting Chen’s
argument that Chang requires Asian Americans to think monolithically about race
and scorn whites).
75
Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L.
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77

sarcasm,” “verbal violence,” “character assassination and attempt to
78
79
silence another,” and “an attack ad with academic pretensions.”
80
Professor Greene’s Gunga Din used an imaginary dialogue between
minority students who interviewed Professor Chen on campus to
make the point that within some law faculties, Professor Chen was
being interviewed as a “minority” who could not be as competent as
the white candidates. For example, one imaginary student described
81
Chen as a “poster child for the model minority” who plays into
82
conservative backlash politics. Professor Greene’s imaginary student
continued by stating, “minority conservatism is driven by self-interest,
83
self-hate, and greed.”
Chen responded by being “unrepentant” and accusing the
“Unloving Eight” of being “bitter and vindictive,” and wanting to
84
“houn[d] him out of law teaching altogether.” Chen went on to
write a series of essays against affirmative action prior to tenure. But
85
after being voted tenure at Minnesota, Professor Chen has stayed
largely out of racial issues, concentrating his scholarly energies on
administrative law, agricultural law, and federalism issues.
Meanwhile, Professor Robert Chang’s call to begin the selfconscious development of APIA critical scholarship has been heeded.
Not only has there been a robust work product by many of the
contributors to the response to the Unloving symposium, APIA
scholars have had an ongoing series of workshops where serious
scholarship is presented and young scholars are mentored in their
projects.
D. Cracking Coconuts: LatCrit and the First Generation CRT
Founders
The most recent missive in the academic literature involves one
of the founders of critical race theory, Professor Richard Delgado,
REV. 1467, 1482 (1996).
76
Chon, supra note 71, at 1549.
77
Gotanda, supra note 71, at 1586.
78
Epps, supra note 74, at 1491.
79
Yen, supra note 71, at 1574.
80
Frederick Dennis Greene, The Resurrection of Gunga Din, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1521
(1996). A “Gunga Din” is an Indian who foolishly takes a bullet for the white English
imperialists. Such persons pursue “success . . . predicated on undermining the social
and political progress of their communities.” Id. at 1528.
81
Id. at 1525.
82
Id. at 1526.
83
Id. at 1529.
84
Jim Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1609, 1625 (1996).
85
Two of the votes would have belonged to Professors Farber and Sherry.
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and the LatCrit movement, which he calls “the new generation of
86
critical theorists.” The vehicle for Professor Delgado’s critique is his
87
detailed book review of the anthology, Crossroads, Directions, and a
New Critical Race Theory, edited by critical race and LatCrit theorists
88
Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris. The
crux of Professor Delgado’s critique is that LatCrit has strayed from a
materialist analysis of race that focuses on power, history, and similar
89
material determinants of minority-group oppression. CRT, Delgado
90
laments, has become too focused on “text, discourse, and mindset”
and has largely neglected the important ongoing challenges to the
91
civil rights of minorities.
Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell, also a pioneer of CRT,
emphasize the class and political components of racial
92
discrimination. Bell’s racial realism, and Delgado’s thesis that
93
“racism is as inherent in Americans as DNA,” share the premise that
racial oppression is endemic to American society. Both have applied
94
neo-Marxist concepts of class struggle to racial conflict. There are
three corollaries to this perspective that racial oppression is deeply
86

Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 125 (2003-2004) (reviewing CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002))
[hereinafter Delgado, Blind Alleys].
87
Id.
88
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes
et al. eds., 2002) (hereinafter CROSSROADS). The volume consists primarily of papers
and speeches presented at the Critical Race Theory Conference at Yale Law School
in 1997.
89
See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 125
90
Id.; see also id. at 123–24 (“An ‘idealist’ school holds that race and
discrimination are largely functions of attitude and social formation. . . . In recent
years, idealist approaches and discourse analysis have moved to the fore.”).
91
Id. at 138 (citing the loss of civil rights of Muslims in the war against terrorism
as a necessary area of inquiry that LatCrit has neglected). Professor Delgado
explains, “The little attention progressive writers have devoted to today's situation
has consisted of examining the predictable issues of rhetoric, mindset, and image . . .
.” Id. He queries “how critical race theorists would see the current situation facing
this country in its struggle against terrorism and for the loyalties of democratic,
modernizing elements in the Muslim world.” Id. at 137.
92
See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, SAVED]; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES].
93
See Richard Delgado & Daniel A. Farber, Is American Law Inherently Racist?, 15
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361, 373 (1998) (arguing that racism is inherent and
intractable, like DNA); see also DELGADO, CRT: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 56, at
xiv (contending that racism is inherent).
94
Bell emphasizes, in particular, how slavery was condoned and interwoven into
our Constitution. See BELL, SAVED, supra note 92, at 26–42 (examining constitutional
provisions sanctioning slavery).

1324

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1309

rooted in American society. First, American society is not a unified
whole, but rather is fragmented and divided. Second, race relations
in America are better described as an ongoing struggle, where one
group wins out, not because of the inherent worthiness of their ideas,
but because they are in a position of power. Third, political
structures, as well as legal institutions, maintain racial divisions. Bell,
Delgado, and other key writers have substantiated their view of race
95
relations with a close study of American history. Professor Delgado
has dedicated his academic life to understanding how systemic racial
oppression permeates American society, and how the law has ignored
the justice claims of racial minorities by framing such issues in
96
formalist legal formulations.
From the beginning, CRT has drawn on the wealth of
psychological and sociological literature on racial attitudes to
demonstrate how unconscious racial attitudes are deeply ingrained in
97
America’s psyche and social habits. Gunnar Myrdal’s classic, the
98
American Dilemma, written almost half a century ago, is a
psychological and sociological treatise on America’s deeply rooted
race problem. Richard Delgado recognized, obliquely, that cognitive
theories and conflict theories—based on interdisciplinary insights—
99
have merit and are an important part of CRT. The question and the
critique, however, is about how much emphasis on non-materialist
theories is useful when a legal movement is dedicated to the
promotion of racial justice. Delgado’s essay puts it this way:
“Nothing is wrong with working to improve racial attitudes, conscious
or subconscious. Yet, we should not be overly sanguine about the
95

See, e.g., id. (examining constitutional provisions sanctioning slavery); Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado’s Historic Embrace—And
Denial—Of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703 (1999)
(documenting segregation and discriminatory practices against racial and ethnic
minorities in Colorado).
96
Professor Delgado’s body of work is substantial and influential. His key
contributions include: RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR?: AND OTHER
APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE (1996);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
2d ed. 1999); DELGADO, CRT: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 56; RICHARD DELGADO,
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1996); MARI J.
MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS
CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
97
See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
98
GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (20th anniversary ed. 1962).
99
See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 127 (discussing Charles Lawrence’s
cognitive theories and unconscious racism).
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possibilities for change through this avenue alone.” Angela Harris
reminded us that, in critical race theory and other identity
movements, there is an ongoing tension between idealist–liberal
101
perspectives and deterministic–materialist analyses.
Richard Delgado is concerned that LatCrit may be “fracturing”
CRT. In his view, not enough emphasis is being placed within LatCrit
on the important new cutting edge questions. He admonishes that
more attention should be paid to the tension between the war on
102
terrorism and the civil rights of racial minorities.
Delgado urged
that close attention should be paid to the impact of “the
extraordinary growth of the Latino population” in the last decade
103
and a half. Immigration, Delgado mused, may be “the new civil
104
Finally, Delgado encouraged greater
rights issue of the century.”
attention be given to the role of racial minorities in our country’s
105
two-party political system.
Delgado’s admonitions are well taken. LatCrit scholars have
been busy working on the very questions he raises, as Dean Kevin
106
Johnson responded in his rejoinder to Delgado.
My own work is
currently preoccupied with what Delgado calls “the extraordinary
107
growth of the Latino population.”
The LatCrit VIII symposium
paid major attention to the cutting edge issue of Latino and APIA
108
voting issues beyond 2000.
Victor Romero, Eric Yamamoto, Kevin
Johnson, Bill Ong Hing, Berta Hernandez-Truyol, and Raquel Aldana
and others have written extensively about how the war on terrorism is
109
jeopardizing the civil rights of racial minorities.
100

Id. at 143–44.
See Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 749–60 (1994).
102
Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 151.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Kevin R. Johnson, Roll over Beethoven: “A Critical Examination of Recent Writing
About Race”, 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004).
107
Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 151. My own view on this “extraordinary
growth” can be found in SYLVIA R. LAZOS VARGAS, CAMBIO DE COLORES (2002). For an
additional take on this population explosion and its effects on the American
workplace, see Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting
Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004).
108
See, e.g., Kathay Feng et al., Voting Matters: APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000
Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and
the Political Process: The Need for Critical Inquiry, 81 OR. L. REV. 917 (2002); Sylvia R.
Lazos Vargas, Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000: What Does It Mean to Move Beyond
“Black and White” Politics?, 81 OR. L. REV. 783 (2002); see also Keith Aoki et al., Race
and the 2000 California Recall, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. (forthcoming June 2005).
109
See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 “National Security” Cases: Three
101
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LatCrit is now a mature movement that coexists with other
second-generation CRT jurisprudential movements. The Crossroads
anthology, Delgado’s critique, and Kevin Johnson’s response are
signs that LatCrit is a healthy scholarly movement. Professor Minow
observed that, “[t]o be taken seriously in the business of law and legal
110
scholarship means becoming the subject of sustained criticism.”
111
CRT is healthy enough to have reproduced. Delgado and his CRT
first-generation contemporaries spawned a second-generation
movement, LatCrit, which is healthy, unruly, contentious, and
ambitious, but yet fits within the key tenets of CRT with its own styled
emphasis. Just as CRT grew from Professor Randall Kennedy’s
critique, so LatCrit will benefit from Professor Delgado’s challenge.

Principles Guiding Judges’ Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 1032–33 (2002)
(describing the detention of noncitizens after September 11 largely on the basis of
race); Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153 (2002) (analyzing consequences of the
“war on terror” for Latinos); Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Glocalizing Terror, 81 OR. L.
REV. 941, 960–61 (2002) (examining the treatment of Latinos post-September 11);
Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 441, 444 (2002) (describing the ostracism of “Muslims, Middle Easterners,
and South Asians in the United States in the wake of September 11” as a “deAmericanization process”); Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants:
Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 863–64 (2003) (examining the
threat to civil rights and increased local involvement in immigration enforcement);
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 39–41
(2002) (analyzing racial profiling and the “racially unbalanced compromises in civil
liberties” post-September 11); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the “War on Terrorism,”
and Immigrants: Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 794–95 (2002)
(arguing that increased local involvement in immigration enforcement could
undermine community relationships and cause an increase in racial profiling); Peggy
Nagae, Justice and Equity for Whom? A Personal Journey and Local Perspective on
Community Justice and Struggles for Dignity, 81 OR. L. REV. 1133 (2002) (analyzing
impacts on racial minorities of heightened security measures); Natsu Taylor Saito,
Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and
the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1125 (2002) (noting the
effects of the USA PATRIOT Act on Arab American and South-Asian American
communities); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race
Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 747 (2003)
(suggesting that the “war on terror” may create opportunities for political coalitions
among racial minorities); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial—
Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1269 (2003) (discussing implications of the “war on terror” for the quest for
racial justice).
110
See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 115–16.
111
Nancy Ehrenreich has frequently made this point at various LatCrit
conferences and retreats.
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II. IDENTIFYING THE GREAT DIVIDES IN THE ACADEMIC KULTURKAMPFS
The many splits in legal academia could lead one to despair,
hide one’s head in the sand, or conclude that meaningful intellectual
engagement, the advance of race relations, and civil academic
112
disagreement are not possible.
This Part further analyzes the
causes of the ruptures in the academic Kulturkampfs and points to
strategies that might be useful in dampening these culture wars.
A. Outsider Critiques: To What Black Hole Does the Many-Headed
Hydra of CRT Lead?
Farber and Sherry and the many outsider critics make the
following claims: (1) that law scholars can ascertain a truth that is
verifiable; (2) that law can fashion “objective” standards; and (3) that
practitioners of law, regardless of their philosophic bent or identity,
113
can clearly discern what is reasonable.
114
115
116
117
Professors Hills, Levit, Mootz, and Rubin have noted that
Farber and Sherry’s modernist claim is out of sync with this century’s
118
philosophical developments regarding objectivity and truth.
The
last century of developments in philosophical thought and social
science, particularly postmodern philosophy, have undermined the
119
notion of a unitary truth.
Instead, this body of work, which has
112

See Lee, supra note 59, at 539 (describing CRT Kulturkampfs as having a
particular ugly edge).
113
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 760.
114
Hills, supra note 9.
115
Levit, supra note 9.
116
Mootz, supra note 9.
117
See Rubin, supra note 9, at 535–37 (chiding Farber and Sherry for failing to
acknowledge that CRT is a derivative of continental postmodern philosophy and neoMarxist thought).
118
Professors Roderick Hills and Edward Rubin focus their critique on this point.
Professor Hills argues that Farber and Sherry’s “enlightened liberalism” is
“astoundingly anemic” because Farber and Sherry do no more than claim that their
truth is superior. Hills, supra note 9, at 192–93. Professor Rubin faults Farber and
Sherry for failing to address the forceful CRT insight that classes who hold power in
society are in a position to construct what truth and objectivity means, and thus
legitimize their superior power and class status. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 537–38
(observing “that society’s assertions about the objectivity or truth of socially
contingent systems, such as merit and law, reveals [sic] a basic defect in its
underlying conception of truth”). Professor Rubin explains that “critical race theory
thus reveals the political and manipulative nature of our society’s prevailing concept
of objectivity, or truth.” Id. at 538. This fundamental insight, Professor Rubin notes,
is derivative of continental critical theory; thus, CRT can be viewed as part of this
larger critique of modernist premises. Id. at 535–36.
119
See, e.g., PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999); GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1996).
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been particularly influential in the social sciences, posits that
objectivity cannot be independent of a claimant’s culture or world
120
viewpoint. Scholarship based on the premise that “truth” is socially
constructed asserts that the cognitive schemas that we carry in our
heads and our cultural preconditioning influence what we believe to
121
be the “objective” “truth.” Another line of scholarship explains that
what we have come to call “reason” has the potential to exclude
women and minorities because of the manner in which they have
122
been socialized to express themselves.
As Professor Farber and Judge Posner, another harsh critic of
CRT, demonstrate in their own work, “postmodern” premises have
greatly influenced legal thinking. In the Problems of Jurisprudence,
Judge Posner asserts that most American lawyers are legal
pragmatists; that is, American law as practiced is more interested in
solving legal problems contextually than it is in asserting stable
123
unitary meta-principles.
Moreover, Judge Posner rejects unitary,
124
objective truth; “[t]here is knowledge if not ultimate truth.”
He
champions a form of legal pragmatism that looks at problems with
full awareness of “limitations of human . . . knowledge, the difficulty
120

The classical claim to this position is made by anthropologist Clifford Geertz in
The Interpretation of Cultures. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
30 (1973) (positing that to study a culture we should examine shared realities, myths,
social identity, ethnicity, status, and “attempts by particular peoples to place these
things in some sort of comprehensible, meaningful frame”). See also RENALDO
ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 202 (2d ed. 1993)
(“The temptation to dress one’s own ‘local knowledge’ of either the folk or
professional variety in garb at once ‘universal’ and ‘culturally invisible’ to itself seems
to be overwhelming.”). For another view of this classical claim, see RAYMONDE
CARROLL, CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: THE FRENCH-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 125–26
(Carol Volk trans., 1988), in which the author urges us to accept that “my truth is
precisely that, ‘my’ truth.” She continues, “I must become able to conceive that the
‘aberrant’ behavior that wounds me . . . may be informed . . . by the truth of the . . .
other. . . . “). Id.
121
See supra note 120. See also Lawrence, supra note 97 (arguing that unconscious
discrimination is so pervasive that it requires a more far-reaching contextual analysis
of discrimination cases); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1211 (1995) (describing stereotypes as a subset of the “vast array” of
structures that comprise human cognition and concluding that discrimination
therefore occurs not impulsively but as the result of an accumulation of subtle
distortions in perceiving objective data).
122
See Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1990, at
126, 127 (“Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or words to
express their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not heard. . . .
[They] are silenced, encouraged to keep their wants inchoate, and heard to say ‘yes’
when they mean ‘no.’”).
123
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26–28 (1990).
124
Id. at 466.
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of translations between cultures, the unattainability of ‘truth,’ the
consequent importance of keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, and
125
the dependence of inquiry on culture and social institutions . . . .”
In several law review articles, Professor Farber attacks legal
formalism. In one, he praises Grant Gilmore’s attack on Langdellian
formalism, quoting Gilmore’s statement that “the body of the law, at
any time or place, is an unstable mass in precarious equilibrium . . .
126
.” In another article, he argues for a form of practical reasoning in
which judges exercise their experience to fine “tune their [cognitive]
127
He contends that judges
schemata to the specifics of the case.”
must eschew “naive” formalism and hew a middle road between
“excessive confidence in the power of the ‘word’” and “unguided
128
discretion.”
Likewise, Suzanna Sherry wrote a controversial law review article,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, in
which she argued that “modern men and women, in general, have
129
distinctly different perspectives on the world . . . .”
The male
perspective paralleled pluralistic liberal theory, the approach that
130
currently dominates constitutional interpretation.
She further
argued that a feminine style of jurisprudence, which more closely
resembled communitarian norms, might be more adaptive for
131
modern society.
The premise of a subjective truth, then, one could argue, is not
at the root of what these critics find troublesome in critical
scholarship. These critics have accepted the premise that there is no
absolute truth, and that differing cultural and gender perspectives
132
affect how different groups interpret truth.
Instead, what these
critics find disturbing is critical scholarship’s powerful combination

125

Id. at 465; see also id. (arguing that judges must adopt awareness of
“translations” between cultures).
126
Daniel A. Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 93–94
(1995).
127
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 556 (1992).
128
Id. at 559.
129
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543 (1986).
130
Id. at 543–44.
131
Id. at 544.
132
See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 106 (1995)
(“Undeniably, pluralization, or postmodernization . . . comes at a certain . . . price, . .
. the comfortable, self-assured determinacy afforded by homogeneity. But this
determinacy was always illusory . . . .”).
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of the postmodern perspective of truth with structuralist analysis. For
critical theorists who are influenced by postmodernism, power
permeates all social structures and relationships. The truth and
norms that will be viewed as “objective” and “neutral” are those that
reflect the perspective of the dominant classes. Farber and Sherry
understand the implications of critical theory when they admonish:
“Don’t let the isms fool you . . . the basic theory is . . . reality is socially
constructed by the powerful in order to perpetuate their own
133
hegemony.”
Farber and Sherry’s work is useful in discerning the principal
concerns of traditional scholars, because they so exhaustively,
candidly, and somewhat emotionally, articulate the ways in which
they find critical thinking disturbing, or in their words, “beyond all
134
reason.” Farber and Sherry reveal that they also have an emotionalidentity stake in this debate by the manner in which they derisively
135
136
refer to critical scholars, engage in not too subtle name calling,
137
and charge that CRT scholars are not really intellectual.
Critical scholarship intertwines structuralist insights and
discourse analysis with identity politics, making for a powerful and
volatile combination. It is folly to think that these issues are abstract
and removed; rather, they are immediate and personal. In a critique
of Farber and Sherry by Professor Ann Coughlin, who has criticized
CRT, she explained why CRT and its progeny touch a raw nerve:
[T]he radical project attacks the political and ethical foundations
of the work that traditional legal scholars do and, thereby, calls
into question the kind of people who we believe we are. To put it
mildly, it is more than a bit distressing for legal scholars . . . to
hear that their entire professional enterprise has been enlisted in
support of a racist, sexist, and homophobic status quo, let alone
138
to read that they themselves are racist-sexist-homophobic bigots.
133

FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 23.
Id., tit.
135
Id. at 101 (claiming that the radicals are sloppy scholars).
136
Id. at 142 (alleging that the critical scholars are “paranoid [in] style and
rigi[d]”).
137
See, e.g., id. at 9 (asserting that the radicals “have relatively little interest in the
nuances of philosophical theories”). It is this aspect of Farber and Sherry’s work that
has led Culp to accuse them of exercising white privilege “to the bone.” Culp, supra
note 19, at 1639. Calmore likewise makes the case that Farber and Sherry have fallen
prey to demeaning stereotypes of racial minorities. See Calmore, supra note 19, at
1598.
138
Coughlin, supra note 35, at 1622. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 9, at 1111–13
(interjecting that the author takes her Jewish identity seriously and finding unseemly
charges that the “multiculturalists” are anti-Semitic); see also supra note 19 (citing
Calmore’s and Culp’s responses to Farber and Sherry).
134
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The personal/emotional concerns that are at the bottom of the
critics’ discomfort can be reduced to the following three issues. First,
do whites, men, and straights oppress minorities, women, gay men,
and lesbians? Second, is oppression so endemic that racism, sexism,
and homophobia are permanent fixtures of American society? Third,
how does one make judgments of others in a world where neutrality
and objectivity are suspect? Let us explore each of these issues in
turn.
1.

Agency: Do Whites, Men, and Straights Oppress
Minorities, Women, and Homosexuals?

As to the issue of agency, Farber and Sherry criticize what they
call the “social construction” thesis that “objective knowledge is a
power relation, one category of people benefiting at the expense of
139
another category of people.”
They locate the agency for “this
covert oppression” of women, minorities, and gay and lesbians in
“straight white males. . . . Everyone else is either a victim, a
140
collaborator, or an unwitting dupe.”
In modernist thinking, someone must exercise power when
there is a power relationship. Moreover, there is intentionality
between cause and effect because when one group benefits over
another, that relationship exists only because someone willed or
caused it. If one can make the claim that this dominant–subordinate
relationship is unjust, then the actor in the dominant position has
moral culpability. Peter Margulies, a Farber and Sherry critic, put it
this way: Farber and Sherry believe that the problem with replacing
the Enlightenment commitment to “reason and cognition” with
appeals to “rhetoric and emotion” is that “the monsters of our
unreasoning imagination,” that is “anti-Semitism, Holocaust
141
revisionism, and religious fanaticism” will take center stage.
Yet, structuralism generally does not attach motivation to the
142
structure of inequality.
Neither does it make moral judgments
143
Instead,
about those who benefit from structures of power.
structuralism limits itself to describing structures of discourse and
knowledge and how these structures construct dominant–subordinate
139

FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 24.
Id.
141
See Margulies, supra note 9, at 1126–27.
142
Foucault, for example, refused to locate structures of power, arguing instead
that power infuses every social relationship. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTERMEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 221 (1977).
143
The criticism can be made that this body of thought is amoral, since its main
thrust is to debunk the liberal premise of individual independence and autonomy.
140
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144

relationships and ideologies.
Critical race theorists could perhaps diffuse the anxiety that
majority scholars feel when they read this scholarship by perhaps
using more precise vocabulary when they describe structures of
racism and oppression. Of course, this would do nothing to diffuse
anxiety that would be raised just because one is addressing these
issues.
Farber and Sherry have it right when they complain that critical
scholars spend almost all their effort in ferreting out racism, sexism,
and homophobia in legal practices that on the surface appear
neutral. When critical scholars describe the social, cultural, and
political dynamics that account for such endemic biases they
generally refer to these systemic constructions as “oppression” and
145
“subordination.” In the last decade, critical scholarship and LatCrit
theory have begun to distinguish among the various forms of
oppression and subordination and work through the implications of
various dynamics. For example, there is an important distinction
146
147
between blatant Bull Connor racism, unconscious stereotyping,
and benefiting from social assumptions because one is a member of a
148
dominant group.
The law reflects as well that these are not
149
uniform acts of discrimination. Those who are conscious that they
144

Antonio Gramsci, a neo-Marxist, found oppression to be a function of the
oppressed classes’ “false consciousness.” Gramsci’s concept of hegemony involved
“false consciousness,” consent by the great masses, and the coercive apparatus of
state power. See generally SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
145
See, e.g., MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY 1–16 (1983).
146
Bull Connor was the Alabama police commissioner who most of us have seen
on TV clubbing and hosing down the freedom riders of the Civil Rights era. “Bull
Connor” racism refers to such blatant forms of racism. For the most part, such
racism seems remote; it is conduct that most Americans condemn, but they also view
it as mainly “engaged in only by other (uneducated, mostly Southern, and morally
reprehensible) whites.”
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous]
Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1493, 1524 (1998).
147
See Lawrence, supra note 97; Krieger, supra note 121.
148
The literature refers to this as “privilege.” See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL.,
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996);
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 969–71 (1993). Jody
Armour argues that whites can become conscious of their racial stereotypes, and
break “habits or automatic processes” that might cause them to act in a biased
manner toward racial minorities. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 755–58 (1995).
149
In Title VII, the doctrinal tool used to differentiate among different types of
discrimination is the intent requirement. See generally Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La
Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415
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are engaging in acts of prejudice or stereotyping are more legally
accountable than individuals who benefit unconsciously from cultural
assumptions.
Also, the concepts of white/male/heterosexual “privilege”
developed in the literature imply no active agency. Rather, privilege
describes benefits that accrue to members of a dominant class
because of their group membership. Social structures and cultural
assumptions cause the dominant group to be viewed as possessing
characteristics that mark them as superior to, and more able than,
150
those who are members of the relational “other.”
For example,
men are leaders and active, while women seek cooperation and are
passive. In addition, members of the dominant group will benefit
when society incorporates that group’s norms and viewpoint as the
151
default standard for the entire society. For example, in the business
environment, it has usually been the case that aggressive leadership
style—a norm favored by men—is more valued, and therefore more
often rewarded than a cooperative enabling style—a norm favored by
women. In exercising privilege, the dominant group “goes along”
with these advantages, choosing not to see them. Privilege then is an
“invisible” aspect of gender, racial, and sexual orientation difference.
In the minds of those who hold privilege there are no racist thoughts.
Neither do they view themselves as agents of the oppression of
minorities. At play are both a lack of consciousness and a lack of
willingness to question the sources of many advantages that these

(2000).
150
Martha Minow writes:
[A]ttribution of difference . . . locates the problem in the person who
does not fit in rather than in relationships between people and social
institutions. The attribution of difference hides the power of those
who classify and of the institutional arrangements that enshrine one
type of person as the norm, and then treat classification of difference
as inherent and natural while debasing those who are different. . . .
When public or private actors label any groups as different it disguises
the power of the namers, who simultaneously assign names and deny
their relationships with and power over the named. Naming another
as different seems natural and obvious when . . . social practice, and
communal attitudes reinforce that view.
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 111 (1990).
151
Professor Iris Marion Young describes the process as follows:
Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant
group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm. . . .
The culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that
they are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered
invisible. As remarkable, deviant beings, the culturally imperialized are
stamped with an essence.
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 59 (1990).
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members enjoy because they are white, male, or heterosexual.
A more nuanced approach to describing the various forms of
discrimination could help to bridge the existing paradigm gap, and
might help to make the discourse seem less accusatory. Moreover, a
more nuanced approach is more descriptively accurate. If critical
scholars are to argue for laws that change the social and cultural
background that constructs race, gender, and sexual orientation,
then they must also describe more cogently those situations under
which the law should hold actors individually accountable. A second
implication is that critical scholars should endeavor to use terms that
more accurately describe the forms of subordination that they are
trying to capture. To indiscriminately use terms like “racism,”
“oppression,” and “prejudice,” lends itself to confusion about what
critical scholars are actually attempting to describe and theorize.
Finally, critical scholars should not lose sight that these labels
continue to be loaded terms. While it may be too much to
indiscriminately proscribe such terminology because it allegedly is a
“conversation stopper,” critical scholars should nonetheless recognize
that these terms have a powerful effect. To use the term “racism” in a
universalistic sense has the potential to desensitize the legal
community to this term. A more nuanced approach could mean that
the critical project may become less threatening to those scholars
who perceive themselves to be in the group of “privileged”
beneficiaries that critical scholarship indicts. Such moderation in
tone, and not in substance, could help to further engagement.
2.

Are Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia So Endemic as
to Be Permanent Fixtures of American Society?
152

CRT in its fatalistic form is deeply troubling and difficult to
accept. Farber and Sherry disapprovingly quote Delgado’s assertion
that “[r]acism is natural and normal—the ordinary state of affairs . . .
153
.” They also retell with unveiled dismay Derrick Bell’s Space Traders
hypothetical that depicts white Americans as willing to bargain with
aliens who will take all American blacks away in exchange for saving
152

This is my own description of Bell and Delgado’s view that racism is endemic to
American society. Both Bell and Delgado contest the description of their theories as
fatalistic. Delgado argues that his premise that racism is endemic should encourage
us to be vigilant and not surrender. Delgado & Farber, supra note 93, at 372. Bell
argues that his “racism is permanent” thesis is addressed to members of racial
communities and functions to admonish them not to be overly confident in civil
rights remedies and to become more self-reliant. See BELL, SAVED, supra note 92, at
12; see also infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
153
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 24.
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154

the rest of the world. Farber and Sherry cite these passages to show
that critical theory is extreme, making three assertions in support of
that point. First, they assert that CRT only seeks to “expose” such
155
“pathologies.” Second, they contend that CRT posits that “[r]eason
is a political entity,” designed to ensconce racism, sexism, and
156
homophobia.
Third, they argue that CRT contends that justice is
157
merely a “rhetorical device.”
This is a strong medicine for anyone, particularly for liberal
whites who see themselves as champions of racial and social justice.
While the proposition that racism is endemic may be discomforting
to whites, it is a fact of life for minorities. Bell describes that, when
he retells the Space Traders parable, African American audiences
instinctively grasp the racial truth behind it and nod their heads in
assent and recognition. The Farber and Sherry skepticism contrasts
158
with this resonance that Bell achieves with black audiences.
Professor Bell is brutally honest about how he sees race
operating in this country. He encourages both racial minorities and
whites to take an honest look at race relations and ask several hard
questions. First, what does it say about whites’ moral makeup that
whites participated for so long in the gruesome system of slavery and
159
accepted its indirect and direct benefits? Second, why do a majority
of whites refuse to vote for policies that would relieve the suffering of
160
poor people, many of whom are racial minorities?
Third, why do
whites appear to be unconcerned that there continues to be ongoing
161
discrimination against racial minorities, even if it is unconscious?
Fourth, why are whites not bothered when there are so few racial
minorities among society’s elites, as CEOs of corporations, influential
162
politicians, and leading educators?
Finally, do whites target racial
minorities as scapegoats in order to imagine their status to be better

154

Id. at 25.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 24–25 (citing Derrick Bell, Radical Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364
(1992), for the proposition that law and courts are “instruments for preserving the
status quo and only periodically and unpredictably serve as a refuge of oppressed
people”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158
See Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893,
903 (recounting that most white audiences react to this story with denial and
disbelief, while black audiences find the story plausible).
159
See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 6–8.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
155
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off than it really is, and in order to identify with privileged elites?
The answer for Bell is that whites are only too willing to look away
from racial problems and racial minorities’ plight. Whites will
advocate changes to social and political systems that relieve blacks’
164
racial oppression only when it benefits them. Bell concludes:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more
than temporary “peaks of progress,” short-lived victories that slide
into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain
white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history
verifies. We must acknowledge it, not as an act of submission, but
165
as an act of ultimate defiance.

What is at play here is a fundamental schism in the
interpretation of American history, the American legal and political
system, and the nature of race relations. It is what Thomas Kuhn
describes in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as an irresolvable
166
paradigm gap.
The proponents of the racial realist paradigm
cannot convert the defenders of the traditional paradigm, and vice
versa. One could view this as a form of the irresolvable “half
empty/half full” debate. Bell and Delgado both take a backward
perspective that emphasizes what Bell calls America’s holocaust—
slavery. Most traditional liberal theorists, like most white Americans,
take a forward-looking perspective that emphasizes the 1960s civil
rights transformation of American race relations. Yet another
perspective on this schism is to note that Bell and Delgado are
163

Id.
This is Bell’s “interest convergence” theory. See generally Bell, supra note 157;
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
165
BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12.
166
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–11 (3d ed.
1996). I acknowledge Professor Stempel’s critique that the concept of paradigms
and paradigm gaps is overused in scholarly literature. See Stempel, supra note 38, at
696 (criticizing overuse of the concept of paradigms among legal scholars but
applying it to the field of dispute resolution). Further, Professor Stempel makes a
very cogent argument that Kuhn’s concept of how knowledge evolves does not fit
well with respect to legal thought. See id. at 695–705. Legal theory does not undergo
dramatic jumps forward, as have the sciences. Id. at 696. Law is moored to
traditional concepts, in large part because of common-law methodology. Finally, law
is not “scientific,” but mirrors social thinking and reflects the ongoing changes in
social science, philosophy and moral thought. Id. at 738. In sum, there are no
sudden transformations, just slow plodding. Nonetheless, I will use these concepts
because they are useful to explain why well-meaning white liberal scholars, like
Farber and Sherry, are unable to accept much of what CRT scholars are trying to say,
and because Kuhn’s concept of engagement is at the core of how I believe legal
knowledge evolves.
164
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addressing minority communities. Both believe that unflinching
honesty with respect to American liberal democratic politics is
essential for minority members to avoid being lulled into false
comfort. Racial realism frees minorities from false hope and enables
them to renew their pursuit of racial justice with “ultimate
167
defiance.” When critics listen in, however, they hear a dialogue that
168
appears to condemn all white Americans.
Kuhn’s key insight is that disciplinary knowledge is as much a
169
social construct as it is a scientific undertaking. Disciplinary norms
and practices can constrain what practitioners can observe and even
170
understand.
When groups function from fundamentally distinct
knowledge assumptions, both opponents and proponents talk past
each other. Each group uses its own sets of assumptions and
171
principles to argue that their “paradigm” is superior. What results
is circularity because neither group can convince the other that its
172
Moreover, because these groups function
arguments have merit.
from a distinct set of assumptions, often the very terms that they use
173
will not have the same meanings.
Racial realism is fundamentally unsettling. Most white scholars,
as is the case with many critical race scholars, find it difficult to
reconcile their legal work with a perspective that asserts that law is
incapable of solving racial and gender injustice. Racial realism’s
main attribute—its unflinching willingness to look at the ugliness of
America’s racial past and present—also accounts for why racial
realism has managed to swallow up much of the current debate. Its
fatalism seems to question everything that is familiar, including
whether Americans are capable of transforming themselves into less
prejudiced individuals. While this is a powerful insight, it is
unsettling to many scholars, who write because they believe they can
persuade legal actors to reconsider how they interpret legal
principles.
Further, CRT is threatening to whites’ sense of a fair and

167

See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12.
See George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of Narrative in
Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 689–92 (1999) (describing how whites and minorities do
not share the same conceptual framework and arguing that CRT narratives are
largely addressed to minority communities which share a common life experience).
169
See KUHN, supra note 166, at 160–91
170
Id. at 151.
171
Id. (“Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense . . .
.”).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 202.
168

1338

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1309

174

innocent self.
With uncanny prescience, Bell foretold that the
questions raised by racial realism are “easier to reject than refute . . .
175
.” As Kuhn and Bell would have predicted, the (white) critics have
strenuously rejected the (nonwhite) view of race relations. No CRT
176
critic has attempted to respond to the hard questions raised by Bell and
Delgado. Yet, many of these same critics claim to be just as committed
as critical theorists to the goal of racial equality.
In the case of such an irreconcilable gap, Thomas Kuhn
177
recommends engagement.
Kuhn advocates that insiders and
outsiders not stop talking to each other, and that they attempt to find
178
common ground on which to continue a dialogue.
It is
engagement by both sides of the divide, so to speak, that eventually
leads to “scientific revolutions.”
There is a sliver of common ground between the CRT theorists
and the critics. It is hopeful that in a debate between Richard
Delgado and Dan Farber, Professor Farber asserts that he has a great
deal in common with Delgado because he believes that “racial
inequality” is “central and requir[es] the most serious possible
179
attention.”
Similarly, Mark Tushnet, in his exchange with critical
race theorists, also reiterated his commitment to racial equality, and
acknowledged that the CRT scholarship he is critiquing “substantially
180
enhance[s] my understanding of the law.”
Critical scholars should take these academics at their word.
They should refuse to be distracted by rhetorical debates as to
181
whether racial realism is “paranoid.”
There can be common

174

Lazos Vargas, supra note 146, at 1524–26 (describing white racial innocence as
an essential attribute of white American identity); see also Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990) (explaining that the affirmative action
debate is framed in the rhetoric of “white innocence” and that this avoids dealing
with problems of unconscious racism). Ross observes that “by repressing our
unconscious racism we make coherent our self-conception of innocence and make
sensible the question of the actual victimization of blacks.” Id. at 312.
175
See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12.
176
See authors cited supra, note 9.
177
BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12.
178
KUHN, supra note 166, at 161–90.
179
Delgado & Farber, supra note 93, at 374. In reality, Professor Delgado and I
share a great deal in our views of law and American society. Both of us see the issue
of racial inequality as being central and requiring the most serious possible attention.
Both of us reject the conservative dogma of color blindness, and both of us believe
that there is an imperative need for dialogue and discussion of this topic.
180
See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 259 n.32. Professor Tushnet’s critique can be
understood as urging that CRT narrative scholarship be more precise so that it can
be better understood (or heard) by mainstream constitutional scholars. Id. at 259.
181
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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ground. The debate has to be refocused by asking how the law can
fulfill its commitment to racial and gender equality.
3.

How Do Whites, Men, and Heterosexuals Evaluate
Minorities Without Risking Being Called “Racist,”
“Sexist,” or “Homophobic”?

Critical scholars’ attack on merit and objectivity can be
interpreted at a deeply personal level. Farber and Sherry reveal this
when they pose the following rhetorical question: “If objectivity is a
myth, and knowledge and merit are socially constructed, where does
that leave those who cling to traditional . . . aspirations? The answer:
182
at some risk of being labeled racists and bigots.” They further allege that
critical scholars believe that “all current merit standards are infected
183
by racial or gender bias.”
Farber and Sherry capture critical
scholars’ attack on merit when they observe that critical scholars
reduce merit to mere “mindset,” the “bundles of presuppositions,
received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background
184
of which legal and political discourse takes place.”
Randall
Kennedy’s critique of Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda is also based on his
own belief that structures of merit in institutions function well
185
enough, and that a black scholar could be judged fairly.
Merit, as an institutional practice, impacts on both critics and
critical scholars directly. Critics, like Farber, Sherry, Tushnet, and
Posner, have attained positions of influence in legal academia. They
make decisions as to who will enter the ranks of legal academia, vote
on the tenure of colleagues, and serve on the editorial boards of
186
university presses and peer-reviewed journals. On the other hand,
critical scholars, many of whom are junior, are vulnerable to criteria
182

FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 33 (emphasis added).
Farber & Sherry, supra note 29, at 1748.
184
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185
Cf. Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1762–64 (urging CRT scholars
to undertake more academic rigor in their critiques). See also Duncan Kennedy,
supra note 54, at 712–17 (pointing out that part of the gap between Randy Kennedy
and CRT scholars revolves around whether there can be a neutral assessment of
merit in legal academia, which is dominated by white elites).
186
See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference:
White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1095 (1992). Professor Culp
believes that “a disproportionate number of blacks will not make tenure” if tenure
standards are the same as for white professors. Id. Making a similar point but
coming from a completely different viewpoint, Judge Posner also believes that “a
disproportionate number of blacks will be turned down” for tenure. However,
because this will be “awkward” for mostly white academic institutions, Posner asks
rhetorically, “are there to be two tracks . . . [with a second tier] affirmative action
track . . . limited to blacks?” POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 11, at 105.
183
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that cause their work to be viewed as unmeritorious because these
traditional scholars have already come to the conclusion that critical
187
188
scholarship is “paranoid,”
“lunatic,”
or dangerously anti189
foundational, charges that have been legitimized because high190
profile scholars and the media have reified them.
In this case, bridging the paradigm gap has immediate and
important implications. Critical scholarship is a jurisprudence that
challenges not only traditional perspectives, but also confronts the
personal, intellectual, and emotional comfort of traditional scholars.
These traditional scholars are the same colleagues who sit in
judgment at tenure time.
Tenure is supposed to be awarded on the basis of merit, but is it?
Critical race scholars have attacked the premise that merit is a neutral
concept. Such a critique does not lead to the conclusion that critical
scholars reject merit altogether. Rather, critical race scholars
advocate reconceptualizing merit in ways that take into account the
potential for cultural biases, whether such biases be based on race,
gender, or sexual orientation. Lani Guinier advises that standards of
merit must be carefully scrutinized in order to ensure that subjectivity
is minimized, and that “objective” standards do not implicitly favor
191
one group over another.
The critique of merit is not unfamiliar.
Farber and Sherry themselves acknowledge that “merit” as an
institutional practice has been imperfect, tending towards elitism and
192
self-replication.
The continued inclusion of critical scholars within legal
193
academia is important. The Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger
explained that diversity of viewpoints and perspectives in elite
institutions whose very purpose is the construction of knowledge is an

187

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
189
See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7.
190
See supra notes 13–18 (citing to popular press commentary attacking CRT,
echoing what journalists understood critics to be saying).
191
See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 968–97 (1996).
192
Farber and Sherry capture critical scholars’ attack on merit. “Judgments about
. . . academic merit . . . reflect the ‘mindset’ of the dominant social groups . . . their
‘bundles of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings.’” FARBER
& SHERRY, supra note 7, at 52. They go on to argue that because Jewish and Asian
American scholars have been able to succeed in academic institutions, their success
“proves” that the standards that have benefited them are not fundamentally flawed.
See id. at 57–59.
193
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
188
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194

essential project to a stable democracy.
Legal jurisprudence has
evolved because the legal academy has been sufficiently pluralistic to
include those who defend comfortable notions and those who
challenge them. Legal knowledge is not unitary. No single
jurisprudential outlook dominates. Instead, there is a multiplicity of
approaches, with no single jurisprudential view ever being able to
195
confidently claim preeminence.
It is important that legal
knowledge remain a pluralistic enterprise. This dictates that a
healthy academic environment be one where various jurisprudential
outlooks can be aired, are engaged, and where each is in competition
with the other. Yet legal academia is also a social institution, so there
are social forces at play that push legal academics towards uniformity,
conformance, self-duplication, and “dumbing down” through the
bureaucratization of legal institutions any ideas and practices that
may threaten the status quo.
For legal scholarship to remain a dynamic and pluralistic
enterprise, the tendency towards uniformity and conformance must
be consciously resisted. Each individual legal scholar who is tenured
will be making decisions as to who can gain entry into the legal
academy through the process of voting on tenure. If traditional
scholars as individuals allow their discomfort with the ideas of critical
race scholarship to temper their judgment as to the professional
merit of critical race scholars who are up for tenure, then the
consequence will be that fewer critical scholars will be part of legal
academia. No one would win in the long run with such results.
Academics must strive to judge those who make them uncomfortable
in as “neutral” a manner as possible, by which I mean first, that those
who judge must become aware of their emotions and not allow them
to color the outcome, and second, that the judgment of merit not
become a quarrel about world perspectives on race or gender.
Professor Edward Rubin has argued that critical scholarship can be
judged fairly by majority scholars. In particular, he has argued that
194

Id. at 330 (agreeing with the district court that the “[diversity] policy promotes
cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables
[students] to better understand persons of different races” and that “classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting
when the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). See generally Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclusive? What Grutter v.
Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming
May 2005).
195
Although this is not the thrust of Professor Minda’s recompilation of legal
movements, his book makes this point nicely. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995).
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CRT and other outsider scholarship should be evaluated
phenomenologically, according to criteria of coherence,
196
persuasiveness, significance, and applicability.
Professor Rubin
argues that the doubt and anxiety that CRT scholarship triggers in
majority scholars by CRT’s challenge to core beliefs can be put to
197
good use.
Doubt and anxiety can be redirected such that one
becomes more self-critical about one’s own philosophical and
epistemological position.
It is through the process of being
198
challenged and formulating responses to those challenges that legal
scholarship can advance. Scholarship, both majority and CRT,
becomes more precise, more reflective, and more balanced through
this process of critique and counter-critique.
Rubin’s approach hearkens back to Kuhn’s observation that the
key to the evolution of disciplinary knowledge is intellectual
199
engagement rather than agreement.
Although insiders may come
to understand what outsiders are arguing, they will likely remain
200
unpersuaded that the outsider paradigm is superior to theirs.
Through continuous engagement and explication the outsider
paradigm gains greater acceptance as an increasing number of
participants becomes familiar with the ideas and comes to accept its
201
premises.
As Kuhn explains, there are important pitfalls in the
process of engaging a competing knowledge community. Outsiders
must recognize that there is a fundamental communications gap
between insiders and outsiders. They must become “translators” of
202
their views. For example, confusion and dissention may be caused
203
when the same vocabulary is used in different ways.
Such
fundamental misunderstanding can be avoided by more careful
explication of terminology and fundamental assumptions.
Challengers can communicate their views and assumptions through
204
By using common concepts and
“share[d] everyday vocabularies.”
principles, supporters of the outside paradigm can “translate” their
196

See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship,
80 CAL. L. REV. 889 passim (1992).
197
Id. at 946.
198
Rubin advises that “the very process of formulating counter-arguments, which
is a mechanism for outright rejection of the author’s work when uncritically
performed, becomes a datum for assessing that work’s quality in the context of a
more disciplined evaluative theory.” Id.
199
KUHN, supra note 166, at 203.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 153, 201–04.
202
Id. at 202.
203
Id.
204
Id.
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own theories to the established group, and better depict the
fundamental ways in which their view differs and the consequences of
that difference. Finally, supporters can “develop . . . hardheaded
205
206
arguments”
and show with “concrete results”
that their
“paradigm” better explains certain kinds of difficult problems that
207
the established paradigm has been unable to address.
In sum, academic Kulturkampfs are distressing at one level,
because they signal that outsiders and insiders are talking past each
other and unwilling to consider what the other has to offer.
However, both Rubin and Kuhn have been helpful in their
observations that an academic ethic of engagement can help bridge
the gap. The goal is not agreement, but that each side develop nonemotional and hard-headed approaches to explaining their own
positions and be willing to be open to the others’ basic premises and
challenges.
B. Insider Critiques: Coping with a Many-Headed Hydra
As Professor Francisco Valdés underscores, LatCrit’s principal
208
analytical methodology evidences a multidimensional analysis.
Because he believes the dynamics of subordination—race, gender,
class, culture, history, social group formation—are too complex to be
209
captured in one or two dimensions or “intersectionalities,” Valdés
urges “multidimensional critique . . . [as] another step toward
helping the LatCrit community better visualize and understand the
210
nature of . . . critical legal theory and praxis.”
Professor Lisa
Iglesias has noted that this methodology enables LatCrit to “tak[e] a
211
stance against all forms of subordination.” In addition, LatCrit has
strived to be inclusive of multiple perspectives and groups in order to
break through artificial structures and classifications that might
impede the exploration of how to attain antisubordination goals.
Such flexibility and inclusiveness can also be a source of tension,

205

Id. at 153.
Id. at 203.
207
Id.
208
See Francisco Valdes, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope In
LatCrit Theory and Praxis, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 899 (2000).
209
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); see also Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
210
Valdes, supra note 208, at 899.
211
See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersections In and Between
Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and Latina/o Legal Theory, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 349, 358 (1998).
206
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which can be grouped around two clusters. The first cluster asks,
who defines the discipline of CRT? The second cluster inquires
whether or not CRT foments non-assimilation.
1.

The Power of Framing and Naming: Who Defines a
Movement?

Professor Delgado’s critique of LatCrit is based on his
observation that LatCrit has strayed from its CRT materialist roots. In
212
his view, LatCrit has “lost its focus” after a promising beginning.
Getting back to basics, or becoming more rigorous analysts, is what
Professor Delgado believes is needed.
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has written extensively about legal
academia as a social institution. He notes that the production of
213
knowledge by academics is a forum of contestation and power.
Bourdieu observes that academics, as producers of cultural
214
knowledge, have an interest in what kind of knowledge is produced.
That interest may be a larger group interest, such as the CRT interest
in racial justice, or it could be personal, such as a researcher’s
215
personal desire for status within her profession.
People who are
able to define a discipline and a movement can also situate their own
216
accomplishments within the discipline, or they can delegitimize an
entire legal movement. Over a decade ago, Professor Jerome Culp
accused Judge Posner of seeking to delegitimize critical race theory
by framing and naming:
[M]y criticism is that Judge Posner wants to control the
assumptions of the debate. . . . He demands the right to control
those assumptions without dealing with alternative assumptions
proposed by black scholars. This demand to control the
assumptions underlying the discourse is at the heart of the
dispute . . . . White scholars often ask black scholars to jump
through some appropriate hoop before they will be listened to by
“real” scholars. If black scholars are doing some mode of analysis
in legal scholarship improperly, then Judge Posner should
217
demonstrate how.

All critiques involve framing and naming. What Bourdieu calls
for is not that ongoing critiques cease, but rather that the scholar
212

See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 123–24.
See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 1–25 (Peter Collier trans., Stanford
Univ. Press 1988).
214
See id.
215
Id.
216
See id. at 24–25.
217
Culp, supra note 186, at 1098–99 (footnote omitted).
213
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understand the social motivations and interests that are involved in
218
her intellectual practice.
There will always be difficulties when insiders try to define valid
methodologies and the core subject matter of a movement, as
Professor Richard Delgado tried to do in Blind Alleys, or what is meritworthy scholarship, as Professor Randall Kennedy did in his Critique of
Minority Academia. LatCrit’s key strength is that the definition of the
movement has been a collective affair. The very structure of the
LatCrit symposia is open, allowing those who have already attained a
standing within the LatCrit academy, like Richard Delgado, to
contribute in symposia and anthologies alongside those who are just
entering the profession. The practice of composing forewards,
afterwords, and cluster introductions in LatCrit symposia among
rotating CRT scholars from various disciplines is designed to import
different individual and disciplinary perspectives. This is a selfconscious effort to rethink and re-situate LatCrit within its own
growth dynamic and in the larger context of legal knowledge.
For this reason, the definition of LatCrit is a moving target. This
is a good thing, but for some it is an unfamiliar practice that is too
uncertain. The principal tenets continue to be hammered out in
LatCrit symposia. The expectation is that the movement will grow
and redefine itself as new members contribute to legal knowledge,
and as the social and political context changes. For example,
responding to the increased governmental powers and policies after
9/11, which disproportionately impact citizens of color and
noncitizens, is now a major part of the LatCrit enterprise. As LatCrit
grows and responds to new pressures it may appear to lose its focus,
but these may just be the growing pains and the cost of commitment
to a “no star” system that ensures the inclusion of all contributors.
2.

Does Critical Race Theory Encourage Non-Assimilation
and Separatism?

The assimilation–separatist debate is at the heart of the role of
minorities/outsiders in America, where the assimilationist ethic is
very strong. The debate between Professors Robert Chang and Jim
Chen is partly about very different views about minorities in the civic
219
polity. Professor Chen, as “an American of Taiwanese decent,”
reacted to Chang’s proposal for an APIA legal movement as evidence
218

See BOURDIEU, supra note 213, at 6–7 (observing that “[t]here is no object that
does not imply a viewpoint, even if it is an object produced with the intention of
abolishing one’s viewpoint”).
219
See Chen, supra note 59, at 146.
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220

of “racial fundamentalism.”
By using this term, Professor Chen
intended to recall other religious fundamentalist movements, which
221
are illiberal, absolutist, and separatist.
Chen carried the “racial
fundamentalism” argument into the personal realm, accusing Chang
222
of advocating in a footnote a perspective of racial authenticity that
is deeply coercive—that members of minority groups should marry
223
and adopt only their own.
The Chen–Chang debate has played out before in the Randall
Kennedy–Bell–Delgado–Matsuda rift. These public schisms show that
minority “communities” are diverse and can be contentious. While
individuals may feel pressure to conform to what they believe might
be a “politically correct” view, they actually do not. And there is not
sufficient solidarity about what is a racial perspective that would
prevent any single minority from expressing his or her own individual
view about the significance of racial experience in America. This is
part of the reason that identity issues and racial narratives seem to
crowd out the scholarly discourse, as Professor Delgado has
224
complained. Everyone can weigh in with some legitimacy.
Foremost, the Chen–Chang debate raises the familiar meltingpot/assimilationist dilemma and the issue of how individual racial
identity weighs into how one views that tension. The dominant
cultural paradigm in the United States has been the notion of a
“melting pot” by which immigrants become assimilated into
225
American culture. However, melting-pot assimilation requires that
the majority be willing to accept the new entrant groups as equals.
Chang’s call for a more sustained analysis of the experience of Asian
Americans is based on his view that discrimination and oppression
226
experienced by Asian Americans has been hostile and aggressive.
Such racism is manifested in different ways, such as the perceived
“foreignness” of Asian Americans and the recurring belief that they

220
221
222
223

Id. at 155; see also supra Part I.C.
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Chen, supra note 59, at 155–

67.
224

Cf. Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 131 (critiquing compilation of essays
in CROSSROADS, supra note 88, dealing with racial identity as not attaining a “unique
voice of color” but rather as overindulging the personal emotional tribulations
connected with being a minority in legal academia).
225
See Lazos Vargas, supra note 146, at 1531–34 (discussing the cultural mandate
of the “‘melting pot’ myth”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?:
Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997).
226
See Chang, supra note 60, at 1286–1303.
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are not sufficiently loyal to the American nation. Under Professor
Jim Chen’s alternative view, racial attitudes are changing.
Racial/ethnic minority individuals, particularly those who have
achieved upper and middle class status, can find increasingly less
resistance to integration, assimilation, and acculturation. This
provides opportunities for individual minorities to assimilate in
melting pot fashion.
These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As
the earlier Kennedy debate showed, individual minorities interpret
228
their own minority racial experience very differently.
Chen and
Chang disagree on facts and theory, but mostly they differ on how
they conceive their own racial identity in a society where
discrimination against racial minorities is real and ongoing.
LatCrit and APIA scholarship has defined race as a complex
historical, cultural, phenomenological, and psychological social
dynamic. Racial/ethnic communities incorporate diverse cultural
traditions, and may encourage assimilation. Regional histories are
another important differentiator. In the case of Asian Americans,
their racial oppression was most acute in California, the Northwest,
and Hawaii, where Japanese Americans experienced forced
internment during World War II. These are areas where we would
expect the boundaries of race to be at their most inflexible and
unforgiving.
With such variability, it follows that an individual’s interpretation
of his or her racial experience will also be highly varied. Jim Chen
does not feel or view himself as an outsider minority scholar, and he
prominently protested the possibility that a fellow scholar of Asian
229
decent might view him as such. To make this “choice” so publicly
and trenchantly seems an odd sort of theater. Nonetheless, Professor
Chen’s racial identity “choice” is as legitimate as Bob Chang’s racial
identity “choice.”
However, all things are not equal. These competing narratives
of racial experience were received differently. Jim Chen’s perspective
validated many of the beliefs held by white academics, among them
those who are hostile to CRT. Chen’s narrative was embraced as
227

BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 28–50
(2003).
228
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
229
Chen protested what he perceived as the presumptuousness of Chang’s
declaration of an “Asian American Moment.” See Chen, supra note 59, at 145. He
makes a point of calling himself an “American of Taiwanese descent,” id. at 146, who
resists Chang’s “secessionist manifesto,” and his call for “racial segregation.” Id. at
145.
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validation of a hostile view of the precepts of CRT. On the other
hand, Chang, from the very beginning, meant to challenge
established legal academia. His public announcement of his racial
perspective and his aim to challenge legal academia by calling for a
moment of APIA critical scholarship made white academics
uncomfortable. Chang’s path was by far the riskier.
CONCLUSION
Legal academia has gone through various Kulturkampfs, with
CRT having gone through more than its share. The question is not
whether there will be more in the future because undoubtedly there
will be. The gaps are based in knowledge and perspective, but what
seems to impede the dialogue most is how identity and ego get in the
way of a healthy dialogue.
Critical theorists can help bridge the gap. First, they must
reclaim the prerogative to define the critical project. In a movement
like LatCrit the challenge of framing the movement is inherently
difficult because LatCrit is self-consciously inclusive, elastic, and
dynamic. Critical scholars, however, should constantly articulate what
they stand for and should resist the temptation, put forth by critics, to
simplify the contours and content of critical scholarship. Some may
argue that complexity and contradiction might weaken the voice of
critical scholarship. However, the insider Kulturkampfs show that
anti-essentialism and complexity more accurately capture what CRT is
and may be able to minimize controversy and confusion.
The critical question is not whether there will be ongoing
Kulturkampfs, but whether there can be an ongoing ethic of
engagement. Both sides must continuously explain how it is that they
differ and the basis for their differences. Both sides must seek to
establish a common language so that there can be some progression
of understanding of our human condition and how the law affects it.
In sum, what is required is that both critical theorists and the
critics exhibit patience with each other and attempt to acknowledge
their knowledge gaps. In addition, both sides need to probe beyond
the distracting rhetoric and earnestly identify where there is common
ground. There is one practice that unifies legal academics. Justice is
a value that is neither outmoded nor suspect.

